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Kovach: The Fallacy of Nonviolent Economic Sanctions

The Fallacy of Nonviolent Economic Sanctions
In the field of international relations, there has been a growing array of misgivings
concerning the effects of economic sanctions—or, to put it better, economic weapons. As former
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has stated, economic sanctions are a “blunt instrument”
that cause harm to defenseless civilians, complicate the work of humanitarian aid organizations,
and cause long-lasting damage to a nation’s health (Weiss, 1999, p. 499). Based on
contemporary research, it is evident that the coercive power of sanctions is much more
ambiguous than previously realized and that their adverse effects on civilians cast this
“nonviolent” method in more injurious light.
Regularly viewed as a form of nonviolent action, economic sanctions can be regarded as a
powerful form of political coercion by a state, generally referred to as the sender state, against a
target state. While sanctions may commonly be viewed as an impassive action against the
economy of an opposing state, there are important direct consequences that must be taken into
consideration. Earlier studies of peace research and nonviolent tactics often include political and
economic sanctions as smart options to create change in an aggressor and to defend a state
(Sharp, 1970, p. 92). However, in the post-Cold War era, economic sanctions have been used to
such an extensive degree that researchers Cortright and Lopez labelled the 1990s as the
“sanctions decade” (Peksen, 2009, p. 59). One result of this increase has been more research into
quantitatively understanding the effects sanctions have had and gaining insight into the
effectiveness of sanctions.
In peace research, economic sanctions are often seen as the most common option when
pursing nonviolent action, as their implementation does not involve the use of physical violence.
Peace advocate Gene Sharp defines nonviolent action as “a sanction and a technique of struggle
involving the use of social, economic, and political power, and the matching of forces in
conflict” (Sharp, 1973). According to Hufbauer et al., when specifically looking at economic
power, the use of sanctions involves financial or trade restrictions used by a state in order to
change another nation’s policies in some pre-specified manner (as cited in Drury, 1998, p. 499).
Instead of using words or physical weapons, which innately cause harm, economic sanctions are
ideally designed to create leadership transformation by depriving target state leaders of necessary
resources. As a result of fewer resources, an opposition group will be able to come to power—
thus completing the “peaceful” change of power.
However, the keyword in the previous description is ideally, as Peksen, who labels this
scenario as the “naïve theory of economic sanctions,” purports that economic sanctions more
often than not create violence and erode human rights through the removal of resources (2009, p.
61). The orthodox view of sanctions also suggests that targeted governments will yield to the
demands of the imposing nation, however, this is also ill-founded with very little empirical data
signifying such capitulation (Allen, 2008, p. 916). First, economic sanctions allow elites in the
target country to increase citizens’ dependency on their control of scarce resources. An example
of this can be seen with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as U.S. sanctions reinforced allegiance of
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political groups to the governing regime. Second, sanctions increase poverty, raise
unemployment, and result in poorer health for citizens in the affected nation (2009, p. 62). Third,
sanctions may be exploited by the targeted leadership to expand their legitimacy and validate
their repression of anti-government groups as exemplified by Cuba’s Fidel Castro responding to
sanctions by diverting the public’s attention away from internal issues. Finally, research has
indicated that sanctions increase the likelihood of anti-government activity, which may include
an uptick in violent action such as rioting (Allen, 2008, p. 935). It is important to note that the
effect of sanctions on violent activity may vary depending on the type of sanction and the system
of governance in the target nation, but Allen’s study does indeed show a statistically significant
positive correlation between sanctions and rioting.
Critically looking at economic sanctions, it appears as though the ends do not justify the
means, since sanctions are discrepantly enacted as a nonviolent method but result in domestic
violence in the target country. Thus, while these economic weapons attack international trade or
finances—and not individuals—malevolent externalities on the targeted society and on civilians
must still be considered as being potentially violent. That being said, however, sanctions are
often levied with the thought that they are a more effective and humane method than military
force. Indeed, many scholars in the field of international studies viewed sanctions with high
degrees of confidence by the turn of the twenty-first century (Pape, 1997, p. 91). However, in
one of the largest studies of its kind, Hufbauer, et al. found that sanctions are only partially
successful in 34 percent of the cases studied (2007, p. 158).
Due to the nature of sanctions attacking broad financial systems or major trade exports, it
may be easy to overlook violence in a target state since the sender nations’ economic sanctions
create havoc that could be attributed to other sources. Also, when sanctions are leveraged by
international organizations such as the UN, the sender nation’s population is unlikely to be
affected, thereby possibly reducing the backlash of attacking a distant country. One result of this
phenomenon is that sanctions tend to be a foreign policy tool that is all too often used by
governments to appear that they are “doing something” (Rogoff, 2015). Moreover, the research
by Peksen and Allen indicates that economic weaponries disproportionately affect civilians,
while often shielding those in need from vital economic trade and humanitarian assistance.
There are studies of economic sanctions used hundreds of years prior to the 20th century. One
popular example is Pericles’s Megarian decree in 432 BCE against Megara prior to the
Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece (Hufbauer, et al., 2007, p. 9). Interestingly, the language
used in playwright Aristophanes’ comedy describing the Megarian decree used dramatic and
violent terms such as “wrath,” “thundered,” and “starving” (p. 10). As illustrated by the
Megarian decree case, the history of sanctions leading up to World War I typically involved
economic weapons being accompanied by warfare or were a foretelling sign of direct physical
conflict to come (Barber, 1979, p. 367; Hufbauer, et al., 2007, p. 10). In the past 40 years,
however, sanctions have been employed for a more multifaceted foreign policy, especially by the
United States (Weiss, 1999, p. 499). For instance, U.S. policy goals have ranged from using
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economic boycotts and sanctions to persuade Egypt to cease supporting Yemeni rebels in the
1960s to President Jimmy Carter preventing the Soviet Union’s human rights abuses and nuclear
weapons proliferation.
Sanctions are commonly wielded in international affairs as a diplomatic tool for the
purpose of domestic security; however, they do not always lead to desired outcomes. As
Hufbauer et al. describe in their history of the practice of sanctions, the use of this supposedly
nonviolent method has not prevented military activities in all instances. Jimmy Carter’s embargo
and boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics did not avert the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan, nor did U.S. sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq prevent U.S. military action
in the Persian Gulf (p. 11). Despite being labelled as a nonviolent strategy, it appears that more
often than not in the 20th century the use of economic sanctions led to the deployment of violent
military methods. In fact, Peksen (2009) finds a significant relationship between economic
sanctions leading to more human rights abuses, including increases in extra-judicial killings and
physical integrity abuses (p. 69).
One key contemporaneous national security example that reflects a failed sanction policy
meant to stem weapons production and human rights abuses is the U.S. relationship with Iran.
Designating the Islamic Republic as a supporter of terrorism in 1984, initial economic
restrictions were implemented by the U.S. soon after the U.S. Embassy attack in 1979 and were
expanded under President Reagan in 1987. After attempts of a reconciliation by President Bush
four years later, U.S. economic controls increased further as evidence indicated Iran was in the
process of developing weapons of mass destruction; a total embargo of Iran would come in 1995
(Preeg, 1999, p. 50). The initial result of the increasingly-bitter relations between the U.S. and
Iran was public fervor in Iran against the “great Satan” (Shehadi, 1981, p. 15). Another
consequence was the shifting of Iran’s trading partners from Western democratic nations to
Eastern socialist or non-aligned countries in order to skirt the new trade restrictions (p. 16). Ties
between the two would only worsen in the post-9/11 era as Iran was labelled the “Axis of Evil”
for its connections with al-Qaeda and supposed expansion of its nuclear weapons program
(Zagorin & Klein, 2004). Despite some of the strictest economic sanctions in the world, it
appears the outcome has been increased trade with non-western nations and furthering of Iran’s
hardline, combative approach in the Middle East.
Another unforgettable consequence of Iranian sanctions are the devastating effects to the
targeted civilians. Even though Iran has actually become a wealthier country since the first
sanctions were imposed, the Economist notes that most of these riches have not found their way
to poor or middle-class Iranians. Moreover, dramatic declines in economic activity particularly
related to the construction trade have had no impact on the ruling class but have led to severe
unemployment that has only led to further poverty (Midlarsky, 1988, p. 492). Furthermore, Iran
has gone unabated for the greater part of the past 30 years for notorious human rights abuses
including degradation of women’s rights, detainment of political activists, and repression of
minority rights (World Report, 2014). While it may be argued these sanctions have failed to
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create meaningful political change within Iran, it may still be too soon to understand the full
consequences after voters elected Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013—an apparent mandate
for change. Today, some may claim the sanctions to be a success, as they have brought Tehran to
the bargaining table on resolving the issue of nuclear weapons development, however, economic
sanctions as a policy must be viewed in light of the tremendous time it takes to see any end
results.
Sanctions are utilized not only for domestic security purposes, but also to bring about
regime change as well, which Hufbauer, et al. find to actually be the most common foreign
policy objective (2007, p. 67). Instances involving regime change reached a peak during the Cold
War years (1945-1989), as the U.S. and Soviet Union challenged each other by influencing
nations primarily in Eastern Europe and Latin America to adopt their respective ideologies. Cuba
is an ideal case to examine, as U.S. sanctions against Fidel Castro’s communist government have
been standing since 1960. During the first three decades of the economic and financial embargo
placed on the island nation, relations remained fairly stable as the Soviet Union propped up Cuba
with over $6 billion in economic support. Preeg (1999) notes that this extensive monetary aid
was a factor in the USSR’s collapse—which may be seen as one positive result of the sanctions
from a U.S. perspective (p. 12).
By the start of the 1990s it was evident that extensive reevaluation of the U.S. policy toward
Cuba would be necessary in light of the “New World Order.” The U.S. Congress took the
initiative to do such with the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which suggested three options for a
new policy toward Cuba: eliminate the embargo, offer a steady relaxation of the embargo with
political and economic reforms of Cuba, or strengthen the embargo (Preeg, 1999, p. 13). In the
act’s findings, the basis for these policy options included Cubans’ “yearning for freedom” and
“opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives,” in addition to noting that Castro
upholds a military-commanded economy “that has decreased the well-being of the Cuban
people” (Cuban Democracy Act “CDA,” 1992). Fatefully, the result was the acceptance of the
latter two options with stress placed on the extended embargo that could one day bring about
reforms. While the original goal may have been to fit Cuba into the post-Cold War world, the
Cuban Democracy Act effectively led to the continuation of the same sanctions that arguably led
deprived Cuban citizens to risk their lives for freedom.
Critically looking at the other adopted component of the Cuban Democracy Act, the
piecemeal relaxation of the U.S. embargo in return for Cuban governmental reforms, it is
important to note the failure of the sanctions to create desired regime change. As previously
mentioned, Castro was able to essentially undermine the entire purpose of the sanctions by
labelling them as an “imperialistic attempt” by the American government to transgress on the
sovereignty of Cuba. As a result, Castro was able to distract attention from internal issues of his
communist government to the external peril posed by the sanctions (Peksen, 2009, p. 63).
Evidence of Cuba’s pushback to U.S. sanctions may be seen in regard to Fidel Castro’s long
reign as president from 1976 until 2008. In addition, while Castro ended his presidency with
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Americans ostensibly opposed to him, several Latin American countries and Canada viewed the
communist leader in mixed or favorable terms (Rogoff, 2015). Furthermore, the communist-run
government continues to this day after Raúl Castro, Fidel Castro’s brother, took over as
president. As it stands, U.S. sanctions following the policy recommendations from the Cuban
Democracy Act have led to a failure to create peaceful political change.
Based on the previous two examples of Iran and Cuba it appears that, in certain cases at
least, economic sanctions as a nonviolent foreign policy tool are far from perfect—for moral
reasons and for the devastating effects on civilians. As Allen and Lektzian (2012) detail in their
research, traditional logic puts the use of sanctions ahead of the implementation of military
forces. In fact, it can be asserted that sanctions are intrinsically a more humane option, as there is
no intent to kill innocent civilians. However, this traditional view has begun to shift as a result of
the amount of new sanctions imposed throughout the 1990s that have unwittingly victimized
innocents and have caused adverse effects on societal necessities such as food, water, sanitation,
and medicine (p. 121; Gordon, 2002). Allen’s and Lektzian’s study helps shed light on just how
consequential economic sanctions can be compared to military actions. Major military use is
indeed more destructive due to major physical damage caused to public infrastructure and health
(p. 129). However, this does not mean sanctions do not have negative consequences. Sanctions
have serious damaging effects on health through the unattainability of vital resources that
hamper citizens’ capacity to maintain normal, healthy lives (p. 132). Although they may cause
less structural damage overtime, the negative attributes of sanctions on the targeted nation’s
civilians, especially on their health, must not be forgotten.
When viewing foreign policy through the scope of nonviolent practice, the moral
implications of economic weapons must also be taken into account. As Thomas Weiss
interpreted economic sanctions, “Their efficacy is doubtful along with their moral superiority
over military force” (1999, p. 499). Since sanctions do undeniably cause some sort of harm, and
not just to the targeted elites and their financial systems, this strategy cannot be diplomatically
used. Furthermore, sanctions violate the Just War Doctrine as there are no clear divisions by the
sender nation between the “combatants and non-combatants” (Allen & Lektzian, 2012, p. 122).
If with military force there is credence given to the killing of civilians, it should thus be
obligatory for the crafters of economic sanctions to differentiate between those who are innocent
and those who are the enemy.
In addition, how can sanctions be accepted practice when their ability to protect the sender
nation and cause political change within the target nation are doubtful? In the case of the U.S.
placing sanctions on Iran, for instance, potential political change was not fully realized until
2013 with hope of Rouhani’s presidency making concessions to the U.S. Also, as shown in the
Cuba case, the use of sanctions to inspire an internal uprising by the target county’s civilians is a
poor policy that shows no consideration for innocent men, women, and children. If a nation is in
a position to be carrying out economic sanctions, then perhaps that nation can apply its resources
toward diplomacy and international aid. By going about this, it may be possible to create less

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015

5

The Downtown Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2

harmful, more effective sanctions. In fact, there are already certain United Nation Security
Council provisions requiring food and medicine regulations with regard to sanction
implementation (Weiss, p. 504). Nevertheless, economic sanctions are a careless policy that
degrades living standards while placing the burden to create change on disadvantaged civilians.
Many researchers have put forth ideas and strategies to amend economic sanctions as to
perhaps make them more palatable, as was put into use with Security Council provisions. One
simple change to standardize the effects of sanctions is to end justification of economic weapons
when civilian living standards fall below basic survival levels (Weiss, p. 505). In addition, Weiss
asserts that the “codification” of sanctions in human rights law could guarantee civilians their
basic rights, in addition to tracking sanctions based on universal standards (p. 506). The result of
this could allow for better monitoring of sanctions as well as make their use more regulated,
similar to how military action is monitored and regulated by UN security forces and dozens of
international non-governmental organizations.
Beyond changes to protect civilian rights, much policy research has outlined general bestuses of sanctions to ensure their effectiveness. It has been generally concluded that economic
attacks and political change have a weak correlation, which may be seen in the rarity of civilians
over-taking their targeted leadership or the perseverance of decades-long political reigns as seen
in the Iran and Cuba examples (Hufbauer et al., 1990, p. 94). As may be exemplified by Cuba
and Iran, sanctions tend to work best when they are aimed at allies and trading partners of the
sender nation. Allies, who may be politically similar with strong economic ties, are more likely
to cause successful change versus being targeted against unfriendly nation-states that have few
economic ties (p. 99). Iran, for instance, responded to U.S. sanctions with a pivot away from
western trading associates. Likewise, Cuba heavily relied on the Soviet Union until the end of
the 1980s for economic support.
As the world becomes ever-more interconnected and globalized, the use of economic
sanctions may only become a more readily viable option as it will be easier and quicker to affect
another nation’s financial or trade system. At the same time, however, it is certainly possible that
civilians will continue to take the brunt of the damage sanctions cause, as the ruling class further
isolates itself in a dishearteningly unequal world. U.S. sanctions against Iran and Cuba are just
two of dozens of examples of the disappointing results of sanctions. Furthermore, in the Iran and
Cuba cases, it is telling that actual change may not be the result of sanctions but the opening up
of diplomatic relations seen today by the Obama administration to allow both sides to engage in
constructive dialogues. After all, sanctions are destructive and violent actions that do not create
peaceful world change.
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